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Judging How We Pick Judges: Fifteen




When Common Cause Rhode Island was founded in 1970,
reforming judicial selection was not one of the organization's
primary concerns. It was an organization primarily focused on
limiting the influence of money in politics and bringing greater
transparency to government.' However, for much of its existence
the organization has dealt with the subject of how we pick judges
in Rhode Island. Why? Because judicial selection stands at the
nexus of power, money and politics, and as this Article discusses,
Rhode Island has a long and sordid history that put reform at the
center of the agenda.
This Article will focus on the reform of judicial selection in
Rhode Island; why we have our current system, and what has
happened to that system in the fifteen years since its
implementation. The Article will begin with a brief history of the
cycles of scandal and reform efforts that led to the initiation of the
merit selection process in 1994, followed by a brief review of the
* Prepared for Presentation at the Symposium, "Judicial Selection in Rhode
Island: Assessing the Experience with 'Merit Selection,"' November 13, 2009,
Roger Williams University School of Law.
" John Marion is executive director of Common Cause Rhode Island. The
views expressed herein are his own, and do not necessarily reflect those of
Common Cause Rhode Island or its State Governing Board.
1. For a look at the early history of the organization, see JOHN W.
GARDNER, IN COMMON CAUSE: CITIZEN ACTION AND How IT WORKS (W.W.
Norton 1971).
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system that ultimately was put in place. From there, the Article
will examine how the system is working today, with emphasis on
attempts to modify the system by the executive and legislative
branches, and draw conclusions about how the system is presently
working. Finally, the epilogue will discuss what might be done to
reinvigorate the system.
I. A HISTORY OF SCANDAL AND REFORM
Rhode Island has fully embraced the merit selection system
for choosing judges. The State went from merit selection of no
judges, to a process covering all judges for state courts.2 This
makes Rhode Island one of the last states to convert to this
system, and one of the only to use it for all state courts. 3 So why
did Rhode Island jump into using a merit selection process with
both feet? In a word: scandal.
"Rogue's Island" as the State has sometimes been derisively
called, has a long history of scandal.4 Indeed, the courts' long
history of patronage politics, particularly with the interference of
the General Assembly, has made the judicial branch particularly
ripe for scandal. Through the early part of the twentieth century,
the judiciary served largely at the will of the General Assembly,
and turnover in the legislative branch meant turnover in the
judicial branch as well.5
The creation of our modern system of merit selection was the
result of two waves of scandal. The first, spanning from roughly
1984-1986, centered on then Chief Justice Joseph Bevilacqua.6 At
that time, the power to appoint members of the Supreme Court
rested in the Grand Committee, which consisted of both chambers
2. Russell Garland, R.L Changes the Method of Selecting Its Judges,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., June 3, 1994, at Al.
3. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: CURRENT
STATUS tbl.1 (2010), available at http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/
Documents/JudicialMeritCharts_0FC20225EC6C2.pdf.
4. MARTY E. MARTIN, PILGRIMS IN THEIR OwN LAND: 500 YEARS OF
RELIGION IN AMERICA 77 (1985).
5. MAUREEN MOAKLEY & ELMER CORNWELL, RHODE ISLAND POLITICS AND
GOVERNMENT 109-10 (2001).
6. The Chief Justice Resigns: A Look Back-Tracing the Highlights of
His Private Life and His Public Career, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., May 29, 1986,
at A17 [hereinafter A Look Back].
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of the General Assembly sitting together.7  Chief Justice
Bevilacqua was sitting Speaker of the House in 1976 when
members of the very body he presided over put him on the Court. 8
The Chief Justice's public associations with members of the mafia
brought him to the attention of state and federal law enforcement,
and in 1985, led to his suspension by the Commission of Judicial
Tenure and Discipline.9  Despite the suspension, Bevilacqua
continued to serve until the threat of impeachment led to his
resignation in 1986.10
Simultaneous to the Bevilacqua story playing out in the
media, Rhode Island was exercising its decennial option to have a
constitutional convention. At that 1986 convention, the
Committee on the Judicial Branch suggested replacing the then
current arrangement, wherein the Governor appointed members
of the inferior courts and the aforementioned Grand Committee
chose members of the Supreme Court, with a merit selection
system.11 Question Two on the November ballot read:
Judicial Selection and Discipline
Shall a non-partisan independent commission be
established to nominate judges for appointment by the
general assembly in the case of supreme court vacancies
and for appointment by the governor in the case of
vacancies in other courts? Shall the commission have
authority to discipline or remove all judges? Shall judges
appointed hereafter be required to retire at 72 years of
age? Shall the duty of the supreme court to give advisory
opinions be abolished?12
7. John Kiffney, The Chief Justice Resigns: A Look Ahead - New Process
To Be Used To Select a Successor, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., May 29, 1986, at Al.
8. A Look Back, supra note 6.
9. Russell Garland, The Bevilacqua Case: Board Censures Bevilacqua
for 'Disrepute to Judiciary' - Chief Justice Agrees To Take 4-Month Unpaid
Suspension, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., June 22, 1985, at Al.
10. John Kiffney, The Chief Justice Resigns: The Hearings - Teitz Thinks
Probe Led to Resignation: A Diligent Pursuit of Evidence, PROVIDENCE J.-
BULL., May 29, 1986, at A14.
11. PATRICK T. CONLEY, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF LAW AND
LAWYERS IN RHODE ISLAND - 1636-1998 459 (1998).
12. R.I. Secretary of State, Voter Information, State Referenda, Nov. 4,
1986.
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This amendment failed on a vote of 147,587 to 126,535.13 The
Providence Journal's description of the failure cited that, "the
proposed system in reality would expand legislative selection
powers while diluting those of the governor. We believe all
judicial appointments should be initiated by the governor, subject
to state Senate confirmation."14
Distrust of the General Assembly's role in the judicial
selection process is a continuous theme of attempts to reform the
system. This is ironic given that in colonial times the Assembly
itself served as a court of last resort.15 And under the royal
charter that was used to govern Rhode Island until the 1843 Dorr
Rebellion, members of the General Assembly were also allowed to
act as sitting judges.16
In 1986 an amendment was passed to create an independent
Ethics Commission to replace the Conflict of Interest Commission
that had been in place since 1976.17 The newly constituted Ethics
Commission was able, according to a Supreme Court advisory
opinion in 1992, to make its own modifications to the Code of
Ethics.18  The Ethics Commission has been enforcing, and
sometimes modifying, the Code of Ethics since 1987.19 One part of
the Code that affects judicial appointment is the "revolving door"
statute that prevents elected officials from taking state jobs for
one year after they leave office. 20 This has proven to be a
significant change in how business has been done in Rhode Island
politics. 21
13. R.I. BD. OF ELECTIONS, OFFICIAL COUNT OF THE BALLOTS CAST 445
(1986).
14. Editorial, Voter Misgivings over the Amendments, PROVIDENCE J.-
BULL., Nov. 7, 1986.
15. DAVID S. LOVEJOY, RHODE ISLAND POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION: 1760-1976 93 (1958).
16. MOAKLEY & ELMER, supra note 5.
17. John Kiffney, O'Neil Leads Violet: Diprete, Licht, St. Germain Win -
Question 14 fails; 8 Amendments Win, 5 Lose; Abortion Curb; Assembly Pay
Hike Rejected, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Nov. 5, 1985, at Al.
18. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Ethics Comm'n) 612 A.2d 1,
13 (R.I. 1992).
19. Memorandum from Jason Gramitt to the R.I. Ethics Comm'n (Feb.
16, 2010) (on file with author).
20. R.I. GEN. LAwS § 36-14-5(o)(1) (2009); MOAKLEY & ELMER, supra note
5, at 110; Katherine Gregg, High Court Hears Arguments: Ethics Law
Attacked, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Sept. 22, 1993, at Al.
21. Scott MacKay, High Court Upholds Revolving Door Law, PROVIDENCE
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In the late 1980s and early 1990s another wave of scandal in
the judicial branch prompted another round of reform. This time
the scandal was more widespread, and pervaded the courts at
several levels. It began with Family Court Judge John E. Fuyat's
resignation after evidence surfaced that he had borrowed
substantial sums of money from lawyers who had appeared before
his court. 22 In 1991 retired Superior Court Judge Antonio S.
Almeida was charged with taking kickbacks from lawyers with
business before his former court.23
Then came the straw that broke the proverbial camel's back.
In 1986, in the wake of the Bevilacqua scandal, Thomas Fay,
former state legislator and then current Family Court Judge, was
elected as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court with the support of
his political ally, House Speaker Matthew Smith.24 Fay proceeded
to appoint Smith chief administrator and clerk of the courts. For
six years Fay presided over the creation of a vast patronage
system that resulted in a series of expos6s in the Providence
Journal titled "The Making of an Empire."25 The articles led to
the downfall of Smith and later Fay, and brought the Journal a
Pulitzer Prize. 26
For reformers, the second wave of judicial scandal galvanized
the political will necessary to finally pass merit selection of
judges. 27 On the heels of the Rhode Island Savings and Deposit
J.-BULL., Nov. 16, 1993, at Al.
22. Tracy Breton, Judge Fuyat's Money Borrowing Under Scrutiny,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Oct. 13, 1989, at Al.
23. Tracy Breton, Former Judge Charged with Accepting Bribe,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., July 22, 1991, at Al.
24. Thomas E. Walsh, Selecting A New Chief Justice: General Assembly
Elections - Judge Fay Rhode Island Chief Justice: Family Court Jurist, 45
Wins on First Ballot with Heavy Democratic Support, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL.,
July 4, 1986, at Al.
25. Tracy Brenton, Dean Starkman, & John Sullivan, The Making of an
Empire: Chief Judge, Top Clerk Preside Over Network of High-Priced
Patronage, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., July 25, 1993, at Al.
26. Dean Starkman & John Sullivan, Chief Justice Fay Resigns: Attorney
General Says Investigation To Continue, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Oct. 9, 1993;
Dean Starkman & John Sullivan, Smith Quits As Probe Widens, PROVIDENCE
J.-BULL., Aug. 11, 1993; The Pulitzer Prizes: 1994 Winners and Finalists,
http://www.pulitzer.org/awards/1994.
27. Russell Garland, Campaign '94 Question 1: Judicial Reform - Voters
To Have Say on Judicial Selection, Legislators' Pay; Scandal Prompted Merit
Plan, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Oct. 11, 1994, at C5.
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Insurance Corporation (RISDIC) scandal earlier in the decade,
judicial merit selection as a form of reform gained momentum. 28
The RIghtNow! coalition, born of the RISDIC crisis, made merit
selection the primary reform initiative. 29 Merit selection, rejected
by the legislature in 1993, had new life in 1994's General
Assembly session.30 Such was the push (and confidence of its
passage) for merit selection that the reform groups asked the
current members of the judiciary to stay in their jobs until merit
selection was put in place so that the Assembly could not put any
more people on the bench.31
A variety of approaches to merit selection were proposed in
late 1993 and 1994. Most involved panels of between nine and
eleven members from a variety of different appointing
authorities.32  The most significant disagreement concerned
whether the Bar Association should have a formal role in the
process. 33 The support of Governor Bruce Sundlun, one of the
delegates to the 1986 constitutional convention that had originally
supported merit selection, proved important in the renewed
push.3 4
In pushing for merit selection, a number of notable reformers,
including Alan Flink, past president of the Rhode Island Bar
Association, and Philip West, executive director of Common
Cause, pressed the case in the media. They stood partially in
opposition to the editorial page of the Providence Journal-Bulletin
that called only for the elimination of the Grand Committee. 35 In
28. Wayne G. Miller, RIght Now! Urges Reform in Choosing Judges,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Aug. 27, 1993; Elinor Mills, Group Urges Judges Not
Be Elected, WESTERLY SUN, Aug. 27, 1993.
29. Miller, supra note 28; Mills, supra note 28.
30. Miller, supra note 28.
31. Garland, supra note 2.
32. Scott MacKay, Agreement Near on Process for Picking Judges,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Dec. 11, 1993; Scott MacKay, Senate Panel Tackles
Judicial Selections, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Sept. 24, 1993, at Al; Sundlun
Endorses Judge-Selection Plan, W. WARWICK TIME, Dec. 15, 1993; Russell
Garland, Judiciary Panel OKs Reform Bill, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Mar. 9,
1994.
33. Scott MacKay, Sundlun Backs Panel Choosing Judge Pool,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Dec. 15, 1993, at C4.
34. Sundlun Outlines Changes to Judge Selection Process, WESTERLY
SUN, Dec. 15, 1993.
35. Accountability and the Bench, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Dec. 19, 1993;
For Permanent Court Reform, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., July 27, 1993; Reform
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West's words, merit selection would serve:
To take the politics out of picking judges.
To ensure that every individual elevated to serve as a
judge is highly qualified.
To restore public confidence in a genuinely independent
judiciary.
To protect the judiciary from future attempts at political
manipulation. 36
Mr. Flink's language was a little more circumspect, when it
suggested that, "[tlhe creation of a merit selection system gives us
the needed apparatus for reform by removing from the
appointment process the overreliance on political
considerations." 37 But his goal of a full merit selection system for
all state judges was no less grandiose.38
On June 2, 1993 Governor Sundlun signed into law a bill
creating the Judicial Nominating Commission for all lower court
judges in Rhode Island.39  But to rid the process of the Grand
Committee, the people would have to amend the Rhode Island
Constitution. 40 That November the voters of Rhode Island faced
Question One on the ballot:
Shall Article 10, Section 4 and Article 10, Section 5 of the
State Constitution be amended and approved to read as
follows:
Section 4. State Court Judges-Judicial Selection.-The
governor shall fill any vacancy of any justice of the Rhode
Island Supreme Court by nominating, on the basis of
merit, a person from a list submitted by an independent
non-partisan judicial nominating commission, and by and
with the advice and consent of the senate, and by and
This Reform, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., May 30, 1994.
36. Philip H. West, Jr., Merit Selection Is the Solution to the State's
Judicial Problems, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Mar. 16, 1994.
37. Alan S. Flink, The Real Merit of Selection, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., June
15, 1994.
38. Id.
39. Garland, supra note 2.
40. Id.
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with the separate advice and consent of the house of
representatives, shall appoint said person as a justice of
the Rhode Island Supreme Court. The governor shall fill
any vacancy of any judge of the Rhode Island Superior
Court, Family Court, District or any other state court
which the general assembly may from time to time
establish by nominating on the basis of merit, a person
from a list submitted by the aforesaid judicial nominating
commission, and by and with the advice and consent of
the senate, shall appoint said person to the court where
the vacancy occurs. The powers, duties, and composition
of the judicial nominating commission shall be defined by
statute.
Section 5. Tenure of Supreme Court Justices-Justices of
the supreme court shall hold office during good
behavior.41
With 69.9% of the vote, Question One passed, and a full
system of merit selection for all state judges in Rhode Island was
enshrined in the Constitution. 42 Use of the Grand Committee to
choose Supreme Court justices was officially dead.
II. FIFTEEN YEARS OF ATTACKS ON MERIT SELECTION
With the inauguration of a system of merit selection for all
state judges, and with all of those same judges receiving lifetime
appointments with no mandatory retirement age, Rhode Island
created a system that would ideally lead to the most independent
judiciary in the nation.43 Once the voters passed the necessary
constitutional changes, the "independent nonpartisan judicial
nominating commission" (JNC), created by statute in June of
1994, was officially in charge of nominating all judges to the
41. R.I. Secretary of State, Voter Information, State Referenda, Nov. 8,
1994.
42. Voters Reform Judiciary, Trim Legislature Size, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL.,
Nov. 11, 1994.
43. Rhode Island was the last state to embrace a merit selection for
judicial appointment. It was also one of the few to move to the commission
process for all judges at once. See AmERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY,
CHRONOLOGY OF SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL MERIT SELECTION BALLOT
MEASURES, http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/Merit
selectionchronology_1C233B5DD2692.pdf.
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executive. 44
From the beginning of the JNC's now fifteen-year history,
there have been patterns of behavior that have repeated
themselves. The first form of behavior is the political branches
acting to undermine the process by putting politics before merit.
The second pattern has been the political branches seeking to
undermine and circumvent the process by seeking changes to
what was initially established. The final pattern involves the JNC
itself setting rules that do not provide for maximum transparency.
First, it is necessary to explain the institutional structure
that was adopted. The enabling legislation created a nine-
member JNC, with a mix of lawyers and non-lawyers. Appointing
authority was vested in a variety of actors. The Governor receives
four direct picks, and also makes selections from lists submitted
by the Speaker of the House, the Senate President, the minority
leaders of both houses, and a joint list of the Speaker and the
President.45  Furthermore, the statute encourages that the
appointing authorities make, "reasonable efforts to encourage
racial, ethnic, and gender diversity within the commission." 46
The original statute required that "[w]ithin forty-five (45)
days of any vacancy the commission shall publicly submit the
names of not less than three (3) and not more than five (5) highly
qualified persons for each vacancy to the governor." 47  The
Governor was required to pick from the list within ten days in
cases of Supreme Court vacancies, and within seven days from
lists for lower courts.48 For the Supreme Court, the Senate and
House must then provide advice and consent, and for all inferior
courts, only the Senate's approval is necessary. 49
A. Political Branches Acting Political
From the very first efforts to select individuals for the bench,
the system revealed that politics was not completely removed from
the selection of judges. Any system of judicial selection, other
44. See generally R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-16.1-2 (1994).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at § 8-16.1-6.
48. For nominations and appointments to the Supreme Court, see id. § 8-
16.1-5. For all lower court nominations and appointments, see id. § 8-16.1-6.
49. R.I. GEN. LAws § 8-16.1-6 (1956).
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than direct election by voters, will involve the political branches of
government. However, more than other merit selection states,
Rhode Island's system allows the General Assembly an outsized
role.50 Not only does the leadership of the General Assembly help
pick the Commissioners, the Senate gives advice and consent to all
nominees, and for nominees to the Supreme Court, the House
must also provide advice and consent. 51
Within four months of the creation of the merit selection
system, the Senate rejected one of Governor Sundlun's picks, John
Rotondi, Jr., for a position on the family court.52 Even more
startling was the rejection of one of Governor Almond's early
choices for Supreme Court, Margaret Curran, by the House
Judiciary Committee, in a move that observers at the time said
was a power play by House leadership. 53 In the Curran case there
were no witnesses in opposition to her nomination, and legislators
cited only youth and lack of experience as reasons behind the
rejection, even though others on the list (and Court) had similar
ages and qualifications. 54 In what would seemingly become
another problem for the merit selection process, opponents of
Curran's nomination cited Governor Almond's lack of lobbying on
behalf of her nomination partially for its failure.55
A dispute related to the consequences of the withdrawal of the
Governor's nominees prior to their confirmation by the Assembly
illuminates some of the concerns with the General Assembly being
involved in judicial selection.5 6 The Court took as its premise that
"the reason and spirit underlying both the constitutional provision
50. Katie Mulvaney, Judicial-Selection Process Debated, PROVIDENCE J.-
BULL, Nov. 14, 2009, at A5.
51. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, MODEL JUDICIAL SELECTION
PROVISIONS (2008), available at http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/
documents/MJSP-ptr_3962CC5301809.pdf [hereinafter MODEL JUDICIAL
SELECTION PROVIsIONs].
52. Russell Garland, Analysis: A New Process of Nominating Judges
Tested, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Sept. 26, 1994.
53. Scott MacKay, House Leaders Flex Muscles, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL.,
Jan. 30, 1997, at Al.
54. Jonathan D. Rockoff, Scott MacKay, & Russell Garland, House Panel
Rejects Curran Nomination, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Jan. 23, 1997.
55. Scott MacKay & Russell Garland, Nomination Fight Reflects Struggle
for Power, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Jan. 26, 1997, at Al.
56. Elliot Krieger, Panel Must Give Almond New List of Court Nominees,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Jan. 6, 1996, at A3.
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and the statute, viz., that legislative control of judicial
appointments be reduced and that executive power of appointment
enhanced."5 7 The Court ruled that the General Assembly's public
opposition prior to a vote would be tantamount to exercising its
power to reject a nominee and could force a nominee to withdraw,
without going through the process of Advice and Consent.58
B. Neglecting and Undermining the System
The second trend in the history of the merit selection system
has been the political branches undermining the process, both by
neglect and through deliberate attempts to circumvent the system.
Neglect has come in the form of ignored deadlines and a changed
pool. 59 The end-run around the system has come in the form of
the explosion of a new class of judicial officers not subject to merit
selection: magistrates. 60
The process of merit selection has never properly worked in
Rhode Island. There have been problems with nominations being
made to the JNC, problems with the lists that the Commission has
produced, and problems with all of the principals meeting the
timeline. 61
The original enabling statute read, "[n]o member shall be
reappointed to the commission; provided, however, that each
member shall continue to serve until his or her successor is
appointed and qualified."62 Since early on in the history of the
JNC, nominations have not been made to replace Commissioners
whose terms have expired after four years. 63 In one instance the
57. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Judicial Nominating
Comm'n) 668 A.2d.1246, 1249 (R.I. 1996).
58. Id. at 1250.
59. Katherine Gregg, Almond Misses Deadline To Nominate Judge,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Oct. 11, 1997, at A3; Katie Mulvaney, Senate Panel To
Consider Extending Law That Expanded Judicial Pool, PROVIDENCE J., June
4, 2009, available at http://www.projo.com/news/content/JUDICIAL
NOMINATING_06-04-09_QBEJD35_v11.3cd73d2.html.
60. Common Cause Education Fund, Unpublished History of Magistrate
Selection in Rhode Island (Nov. 16, 1997) (on file with author).
61. For an example of missed deadlines, see Gregg, supra note 59. For
an example of delays in the process, see Tracy Breton, New Judge Selection
Held Up By Character Checks, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Nov. 12, 1999, at B1.
62. R.I. GEN. LAws § 8-16.1-2 (1994).
63. Katherine Gregg, Russell Garland, John E. Mulligan & Scott
MacKay, Political Scene: Who Says No to a $3,100 Raise?, PROVIDENCE J.-
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Commissioner sat for eleven years, almost three full terms. 64 A
chronic lateness has plagued the appointing authorities over the
years, so much so that at one point two-thirds of the
Commissioners were sitting despite expired terms.65 And even
when the legislative leaders have created lists, Governor Carcieri
has taken over a year to choose.66 The neglect in making
appointments is more than a mere worry about the legitimacy of
the Commission, it has been demonstrably detrimental to the
process itself, causing a deadlock in voting for one Supreme Court
vacancy.6 7
When nominations have been made they have undermined
the statute. In several instances there have been reappointments,
despite the express language in the original statute.6 8  No
appointment epitomized the problems of holdovers and
reappointments more than that of Commissioner Gerard Visconti,
who was reappointed in 2000, despite having previously served on
the Commission for the first year after its inauguration. 69 He
then sat until 2007 because the Governor failed to replace him on
the expiration of his term. Mr. Visconti served the equivalent of
eight years spread over the course of two appointments. 70
In several instances we have seen appointments that are so
closely associated with the political branches as to call into
BULL., Sept. 29, 1997, at B1, B3.
64. Katie Mulvaney, Two Appointed to Judicial Nominating Commission,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Oct. 3, 2009, at A5.
65. Katie Mulvaney, Six on Judgeship Panel Serving Under Expired
Terms, PROVIDENCE J. -BULL., Feb. 24, 2009.
66. Katherine Gregg, Liz Anderson, & Edward Fitzpatrick, Political
Scene - High Tech Entrepreneur Returning to Politics with State GOP,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Jan. 3, 2005, at Bl.
67. Edward Fitzpatrick, R.L High Court Candidates Cut to 5 Finalists,
PROVIDENCE J., Apr. 29, 2005, available at
http://www.projo.com/news/content/projo_20040429_jnc29.2a240b.html#.
68. R.I. GEN. LAws § 8-16.1-1(c) originally read, "No member shall be
reappointed to the commission." Despite that directive, Governor Carcieri
appointed Commissioner June Tow, who had previously served from 1998-
2002, to a new term in 2007. As a result, the language in the statute was
subsequently changed to read, "No person shall be appointed at any time to
serve more than one term as a member of the commission." See also Edward
Fitzpatrick, Judicial Panel's Makeup Blasted, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Mar. 16,
2007, at Bl.
69. Jonathan D. Rockoff, Lawyer Visconti Picked To Head Judicial Panel,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Dec. 22, 2000, at BI, B4.
70. Fitzpatrick, supra note 68, at B3.
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question whether they qualify as "independent."71  Sharon
Burgess, a neighbor of House Speaker John Harwood, kept a seat
on the Commission years past the expiration of her term.72 In a
more recent instance, current Speaker William Murphy's law
partner was placed on the Commission. 73 If those who crafted the
legislation sought to expressly prohibit two members of the
Commission from being from the same law firm, it is reasonable to
infer that they did not intend for Commissioners to be law
partners with legislative leadership. 74 Yet another instance saw a
top lawyer for the State, possibly in conflict of the statute's
prohibition against public officials, be placed on the
Commission. 75
The final way in which the political branches have neglected
both the institution of the JNC and the process it carries out has
been through the disregard for deadlines set out in the statute.76
The original statute called for the Governor to choose from
Supreme Court lists within ten days, and lists from the lower
courts in seven days. 77 Those provisions were understandably
changed to twenty-one days early in the life of the merit selection
process. Despite the change, a wholesale disregard for the
deadline has persisted.78
Governor Carcieri has termed the deadline to be "merely
advisory" through his surrogates, and in several instances has
waited over one year to make appointments. 79  In seeming
contradiction to his concern that twenty-one days is too restrictive,
the Governor has seen fit to interview candidates prior to the list
being produced.ao Governor Carcieri has gone so far as to express
an indifference to the process of selecting judges altogether, saying
7 1. Id.
72. Jonathan D. Rockoff, Burgess to remain on judicial panel.
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Nov. 18, 2000.
73. Mulvaney, supra note 64.
74. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 8-16.1-2 (1994).
75. Fitzpatrick, supra note 68.
76. Gregg, supra note 59.
77. See statutes cited supra note 48.
78. Gregg, supra note 59; Katie Mulvaney, List of Judicial Vacancies in
R.I. Grows; Help Wanted, PROVIDENCE J.-BuLL., Jan. 13, 2009, at Al.
79. Carcieri Will Leave Imprint on Courts, Selection Process, PROVIDENCE
J.-BULL., Sept. 13, 2009, at A3.
80. Katie Mulvaney, Carcieri Criticized on Early Judge Interviews,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., June 5, 2009, at Bl.
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"[i]f you'd [told] me when I came into this job that I'd be
appointing a lot of judges, I'd have said, 'What's that?' I mean, it's
not even a part you focus on."81
The JNC itself came under criticism over a decade ago for
taking longer than the proscribed time to create lists for the
Governor. 82 The apparent glut of nominees led to background
checks by the state police slowing down the process. 83
Whether or not missed deadlines and interpretations
represent willful attempts to undermine the system is debatable.
It is beyond dispute that efforts have been made to alter the
system in a way that undermines its original intent. 84
A specific example is the creation of an expanded pool from
which the Governor can choose, instead of the three to five names
as originally written. 85 This change in the law, referred to as the
"five-year look-back" has dramatically expanded the pool,
particularly given the recent glut of vacancies. 86 While some
agree with this approach, it clearly goes against the best practices
as advocated by the American Judicature Society.87
But the most dramatic effort to undermine the system of
merit selection in Rhode Island has been the explosion of the
number and duties of magistrates in the state. 88 In 1994, there
were five "masters" in the judicial branch in Rhode Island.89
81. Time To Move on Consolidation, Judges, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Jan.
25, 2009, at Dl.
82. Gregg, supra note 59.
83. Tracy Breton, New Judge Selection Held Up By Character Checks,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Nov. 12, 1999, at B1.
84. The model merit selection system advocated by the American
Judicature Society calls for commissions with staggered terms and provides
small lists to governors. Neither of these are occurring in Rhode Island due
to the breakdown in the system. For model provisions see MODEL JUDICIAL
SELECTION PROVISIONS, supra note 51.
85. See Noah Schafer, Plan To Change Way Judges Picked Earns R.I.
Judicial Nominating Commission's Support, R.I. LAW. WKLY., Mar. 5, 2007,
at 1, 12.
86. Mulvaney, supra note 59.
87. See MODEL JUDICIAL SELECTION PROVISIONS, supra note 51; Julia
Reischel, A Quick Word with ... Stephen J. Carlotti, RHODE ISLAND LAWYERS
WEEKLY, Sept. 28, 2009.
88. Common Cause Education Fund, supra note 60. For a look at one
attempt to reform this system, see Katherine Gregg, Bill Would Overhaul
Magistrate Selection, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Apr. 21, 2005, at Bl.
89. Common Cause Education Fund. supra note 60.
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Fifteen years later they have acquired a new name (magistrates)
and have proliferated in number and duties. Currently there are
twenty-one magistrates in a variety of courts in Rhode Island.90
An even more dramatic expansion was proposed and rejected
during the reorganization of the traffic tribunal. 91
There are two reasons that magistrates have undermined the
purpose of the merit selection process. First, they are not subject
to being chosen by the JNC. They are subject to a variety of
selection processes, with the presiding justice of their respective
courts often making the selection.92 Second, they have been filled
with appointees that are clearly linked to the political branches of
government.93
Magistrates do not try cases, but perform seemingly all other
functions of judicial officers in the state of Rhode Island. 94 The
continued swelling of their ranks, at the initiation of the General
Assembly, indicates a desire of that branch to remove a significant
part of the judicial branch from the merit selection process. 95
Repeated attempts to put magistrates under the merit selection
process have failed, although on two occasions a bill went as far as
passing the state Senate. 96
C. The JNC's Failure to Insulate
One matter that has not been mentioned so far is that the
JNC itself is an institution, with processes of its own. Those
processes were created by the JNC early in its life, and have been
the subject of debate over the course of its existence. 97
90. Katie Mulvaney, Advocates Push To Revamp Magistrate-Selection
Process, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Mar. 8, 2009.
91. Christopher Rowland, Traffic-Court Plan Swells Judicial Ranks,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Apr. 15, 1999.
92. Common Cause Education Fund, supra note 60.
93. Mulvaney, supra note 90.
94. Katherine Gregg, Bill Would Convert Magistrates into Judges,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Jan.23, 2002, at Bl.
95. Magistrates' positions are created by statutes initiated and approved
by the General Assembly.
96. Liz Anderson, Senate Approves Magistrate's Bill, PROVIDENCE J.-
BULL., May 14, 2003, at B6.
97. For a look at the early history of the JNC, see Michael J. Yelnosky,
Rhode Island's Judicial Nominating Commission: Can "Reform" Become
Reality?, 1 ROGER WILLIAMS U.L. REV. 87, 88 (1996). For a look at one of the
skirmishes over the rules of the JNC, see Katherine Gregg, Judicial Panel
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One of the stated goals for creating the JNC was to remove
political manipulation from the process of selecting judges by
opening the process to public scrutiny. With the removal of
political manipulation, it was hoped that not only would better
judges come out of the process, but trust in the process would
increase. 98
The Commission has gone a long way to opening up the
process. By its choice the interviews conducted are public
meetings, and testimony, both written and oral, is taken. This is a
credit to the Commission, and to the media that has covered
hundreds of hearings over the last fifteen years. There have been
attempts to limit the information the Commission receives.99 At
one point the Chair of the Commission suggested that perhaps the
votes should be conducted in private.100
However, there are three ways in which the Commission has
not been as forthcoming as it might be. First, it rejected a
proposal backed by Governor Almond in 2001 that would ban
Commissioners from having discussions about applicants outside
of the confines of the public comment hearing.101 The vote, a four-
four tie, suggests that there was at least some support for the idea
that a prohibition on this type of communication was necessary.102
And public comments about the overwhelming contacts that the
Commissioners receive have been noted publicly.103 Former JNC
Chair, Michael A. Kelly, accused then Governor Almond's deputy
legal counsel of meddling, saying, "[y]our private conversations
with the recent gubernatorial appointees to the commission along
with their blatant actions to further the candidacy of a candidate
the governor has publicly stated he would like to see on the list of
nominees, is creating an appearance of impropriety and undue
Rejects Limits on Political Ties, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Dec. 18, 2001.
98. West, supra note 36.
99. Edward Fitzpatrick, Lynch: Judicial Commission Erred in
Withholding Letters, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Aug. 20, 2008, at Al, A4.
100. Edward Fitzpatrick, Top Lawyer Bypassed for Supreme Court,
PROVIDENCE J., Apr. 25, 2004, available at
http://www.projo.com/news/content/projo-20040425jnc25.26a416.html#.
101. Gregg, supra note 97.
102. See Jonathan D. Rockoff, Judicial Panel Considers Rule To Squeeze
Politics from Process, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Dec. 11, 2001, at B3.
103. Katherine Gregg, Judicial Panelist Criticizes Almond Aide,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Dec.4, 1996, at Bl.
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influence on the commission by the governor's office."1 04
The second way has been the ad hoc reporting of the number
of applicants. The Commission has never had uniform reporting
of any statistics related to its work, as suggested by Michael
Yelnosky.105  It appears from news reports that information
regarding the number of applicants has varied historically.
Finally, we have seen the Commission seek to change past
practice and withhold letters submitted on behalf of applicants
when requested by the media.106 The Attorney General ruled that
the letters are indeed subject to the Access to Public Records
Act.107
CONCLUSION
In hindsight, reformers were too optimistic when they
promised that merit selection would remove the politics from
picking judges. 0 8 The best we can hope for is that the politics are
minimized, and that merit becomes one of the chief factors
considered in selection. That is the standard to which the system
in Rhode Island should be held.
You cannot allow the political branches to have any say in the
selection of judges and at the same time remove the politics. And
to remove the political branches entirely would be to make judicial
selection completely unaccountable to the people.109 In the case of
Margaret Curran, the Rhode Island House simply protested its
partial removal (the elimination of the Grand Committee) by
rejecting a nominee from a Governor of the other party. Margaret
Curran was by all accounts a qualified person who otherwise
might never have made it before the General Assembly, and that
in and of itself may be a victory.110
104. Id.
105. Michael J. Yelnosky, A Noncynical Look at Judicial Reform,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Mar. 21, 1995.
106. Edward Fitzpatrick, AG Asked To Rule on Access to Letters,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., July 18, 2008, at B1, B3.
107. Fitzpatrick, supra note 99.
108. West, supra note 36.
109. No system of picking judges is truly independent of the political
branches; all provide a role for elected officials in at least some of the
following: selection of commissioners, selection of judges from the
commission's list, and the advice and consent of judicial picks.
110. See Scott MacKay & Russell Garland, Nomination Fight Reflects
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Certainly, beyond the isolated incident of an individual, how
is the system performing? The institution and processes of merit
selection have never really had a chance to establish the
independence that is part of its mandate. It has suffered from
neglect, both wanton and benign over the fifteen years of its
existence.
Indeed there are aspects of the system in Rhode Island that
are highly admirable. Most notable is the openness. It is actually
a shame that more citizens do not participate in the process by
attending hearings, and testifying. The JNC has an admirable
record in complying with the open meetings laws, and widely
advertises for judicial vacancies. 111
What is most problematic, however, is the continued effort to
undermine both the institution and process through neglect and
change. The change in the statute that allows governors to choose
from past lists generated by the JNC undermines the best
practices, as mentioned previously. The disregard of successive
governors of the timeline for selecting from the Commission's list
suggests a lack of respect for the process that was created in 1994.
The lack of respect for deadlines has damaged the institution
itself. Commissioners sitting far past the expiration of their terms
undermine the concept of rotation and prevent the staggered
terms, that were part of the initial legislation, from ever taking
hold.
Finally, the creation of an entire separate class of judicial
officers in the form of magistrates subverts the will of the voters
who were looking to change the selection process for the judicial
branch.
Certainly the merit selection process in Rhode Island does not
live up to the hype suggested by reform advocates fifteen years
ago. No system could, quite frankly. Has it produced a better
Struggle for Power, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Jan. 26, 1997, at Al (contemporary
coverage suggesting Curran was simply a victim of political circumstance).
Ms. Curran's subsequent career as the United States Attorney from Rhode
Island, which required U.S. Senate Confirmation, suggests her inexperience
and qualifications might not have been so weak. See John E Mulligan,
Curran Confirmed as US Attorney By Senate, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Oct. 22,
1998, at B1.
111. See Office of the Secretary of the State, Open Meetings,
http://sos.ri.gov/openmeetings/?pageview-entity&id=106 (last visited June
18, 2010) (archive of notices and minutes of JNC meetings).
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class of judges? That is a conclusion is for others to draw. Has it
created a process that is better than the Grand Committee?
Certainly. Could it be improved? Unquestionably.
EPILOGUE: MODEST PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
What can be done to get the institution and process of merit
selection to work as intended? Reforms are necessary, both in the
statute establishing the JNC, and within the rules of the
Commission itself.
The first change would be to do away with never ending terms
for Commissioners. Unfortunately the legislature currently does
not see this as necessary at this time. 112
Ending the five-year look-back would also restore the process
to what it was intended to be. Certainly not requiring those who
remain eligible for up to five years after their initial application to
recertify the contents of those applications in some manner
undermines the idea that the list is fresh and the most highly
qualified candidates at that point in time are being put forward.
Putting teeth into the twenty-one day rule for the Governor
would certainly be a helpful change. Separation of powers issues,
however, may prevent Rhode Island from following best practices
in this regard and giving some other appointing authority the
ability to make selections from the list.
By putting magistrates under merit selection the legislature
could restore faith that the selection of judicial officers is not
guided by the need to provide patronage.
The Commission itself could change rules that govern its
behavior. Most radically, it could prevent Commissioners from
having outside contact about applicants. And it could disclose the
names of all candidates, thus allowing the public to decide if it
granted interviews to only the most qualified. More simply, it
could produce an annual report summarizing the characteristics of
applicants and noting who received interviews and ultimately
made lists.
112. A bill (S 428) introduced in the 2009 session of the General Assembly
to remove members of the commission after the expiration of their terms was
passed only after a floor amendment removed the relevant language. See
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS, JOURNAL OF THE
SENATE. Vol. 136, No. 62 (RI 2009), available at
http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/journalsO9/senatejournals09/sjournal6-24.pdf.
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Some have suggested the creation of a separate structure to
"rate" applicants, akin to the ABA's rating system in the federal
courts. This belies the entire point of having a JNC. It is for the
Commission to determine merit. They are provided with all of the
necessary information to do so, and are theoretically capable of
acting on that information.
Merit selection is very much a work in progress in Rhode
Island. Hopefully, when another fifteen years have passed, we
can see a much more mature and secure system. And even more,
hopefully the years of scandalous judicial behavior are long over.
